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Abstract: Matters of border control in twenty-first century Japan interact with
current social issues involvingdemography, the labour market, and economic
relationships with other countries in the region. Japan faces a rapidly aging population,
the highest life expectancy in the world, a birthrate well below replacement level, and a
shrinking population. Smaller families find it difficult to provide primary care for the
sick, the elderly and those with disabilities, and the welfare system is stretched to the
limit. At the same time, Japanese people are increasingly unwilling to undertake work
regarded as ‘manual labour’ or ‘unskilled labour’ Thus, the management of border control
is related to the labour market, and the management of welfare. This is a range of policies
which I would like to refer to as involving the management of bodies. This article thus
focuses on ‘the management of borders’ and the ‘management of bodies’ in
contemporary Japan.
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*

In April 2009 it was reported that the Japanese government was offering a one-off

grant of ¥300,000 (approximately US$3,000) per person to some immigrant workers in
order to facilitate their return to their homelands.1 The offer was directed at immigrant
workers of Japanese descent– colloquially known as Nikkei-jin – who had been
encouraged to come and work in Japan in the 1990s from Peru, Brazil and other parts of
Latin America (‘Axed Brazilians, Peruvians to be paid to leave Japan’, 2009). The
community of these immigrants and their families has thus existed in Japan for close to
two decades.

The report that Japan was trying to find a way of encouraging these immigrants to
return to their countries of birth suggests that we are entering a new iteration of the cycles
of labour mobility between Japan and other nations. Recent trends in labour mobility
reflect Japan’s place as one of the most influential economies in the Asia-Pacific region –
even in the wake of the global financial crisis – and as one of the magnets for
documented and undocumented migrant labour. The changing fortunes of these labour
immigrants of Japanese heritage also, however, need to be placed in the context of a
longer history of emigration and immigration, dating back to the nineteenth century. The
‘Nikkei’ immigrants are the descendants of those who left Japanese rural areas in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century to escape rural poverty, with the encouragement of
the governments of the time (Befu 2000: 17–40; Dresner 2008: 66–94; Quan 2004: 339–
367). In 2007 it was estimated that there were 2.15 million registered foreign residents in
Japan, nearly twice as many as in 1990. This figure would include these recent
immigrants, but also the (non-naturalised) descendants of Korean and Taiwanese families
who have been in Japan since the colonial period (Daimon 2009), and smaller numbers of
skilled sojourners, trainees and international students. There are an estimated 110,000
unregistered foreign residents (‘Editorial: The foreign residents among us’ 2009).2

Several other recent reports further suggest that this first decade of the twenty-first

century is an important period in the management of borders in contemporary Japan.
There have been controversies concerning requests for permanent residency by some who
had originally entered illegally or had overstayed (Fukue and Matsutani 2009; ‘10-year
overstayer is granted new visa’, 2009). Other controversies concern the nationality of
descendants of Japanese fathers and non-Japanese mothers (Agnote 2008a; 2009); and
there has been discussion of whether to remove restrictions on dual nationality (Matsutani
2009). We have also seen new international agreements directed at encouraging the
temporary migration of care workers to Japan from Indonesia and the Philippines
(Agnote 2008b; Kaneko 2009, Itô 2008; Itô in press). Meanwhile, the government is
gradually reforming its border control regime. In this article, I will consider these recent
issues of border control, and how they interact with the management of the labour market
and the management of social policy issues.

These matters of border control interact with current social issues involving the
changing demography of Japan, a changing labour market, and changing economic
relationships with other countries in the region. Japan is now facing a rapidly aging
population with the highest life expectancy in the world, a birthrate well below
replacement level, and a shrinking population. Smaller families find it difficult to provide
primary care for the sick, the elderly and those with disabilities, and the welfare system is
stretched to the limit. At the same time, Japanese people, until recently, almost
universally saw themselves as ‘middle-class’, and have been unwilling to undertake types
of work regarded as ‘manual labour’ or ‘unskilled labour’.3 Thus, as I shall argue below,
the management of border control is also related to the labour market, the management of
welfare, and the state of the caring professions. This is a range of policies which I would
like to refer to as involving the management of bodies. This article thus focuses on ‘the
management of borders’ and the ‘management of bodies’ in contemporary Japan.

The ‘management of bodies’ could also be framed in terms of Foucault’s concept of
‘biopower’. As biopower, individuals are mobilised by the state as resources: as workers,
as citizens, and as family members responsible for the reproduction of the population
(Foucault 1980: 138–145; Schirato and Webb 2003: 135). In the current age of economic
globalisation, however, the management of biopower is also a matter which crosses
national boundaries. Global corporations attempt to maximise profits through accessing
cheaper labour power. Or, as Hancock et al explain, ‘transnational capitalism demands
flexible bodies for flexible accumulation’ (2000: 1). While workers attempt to maximise
their income through crossing national borders, nation-states attempt to regulate these
flows through border controls (Mackie and Stevens 2009: 260).

Japan’s Demographic Challenge

In April 2009, a Japanese government white paper reiterated that ‘Japan is graying
and its birthrate is falling faster than any other country in the world’ (‘Japan birthrate fall
world's No. 1’, 2009). Japan's total fertility rate – the average number of children born
per woman aged between 15 and 49 – dropped continuously until the early 2000s. The
fertility rate was 2.16 in 1971, 1.29 in 2004, bottoming out at 1.26 in 2005, then inching
up to 1.34 in 2007. Japan has the highest life expectancy in the world: 85.62 years for
women; 78.8 years for men; and 82.12 for the total population. Young people are
marrying later, having fewer children, and the mean age at which women have their first
child rose from 25.6 in 1970 to 28.9 in 2004. An increase in the number of irregular
workers and the worsening employment situation also contribute to a reluctance to marry
and have children. The population is shrinking. It stood at 127,692,000 as of Oct. 1, 2008,
down 0.06 percent from the previous year. In 2005, the number of deaths surpassed that
of births for the first time by 21,266. In 2008, there were a record 51,317 more deaths
than births. It is estimated that the population will shrink to about 90 million by 2055

(‘Editorial: Raising the Birthrate’. 2009).

Currently, in Japan there are two bulges in the population chart: those from the
postwar baby boom who are at or close to retirement age; and those in their thirties, born
in the secondary boom of the 1970s. People aged 65 or older accounted for 22.5 percent
of Japan's total population as of April 2009, and this is projected to increase to around 35
per cent by 2050. In 2004, an astonishing 1.02 million persons (out of a total population
of 127.69 million) in Japan were aged 90 or more. In April 2009 there were an estimated
17.14 million children under the age of 15, or 13.4 per cent of the population, marking a
record low for the 28th straight year (‘Number of Children continues to fall’. 2009).

If we add up the population under 15 and the population over 65 and divide this by
the productive population (those from 15 to 64) we get a dependent population rate of
around 50 per cent. In other words, the two thirds of the population of productive age
have to work to support the other third who are too old or too young to work. The
productive population is expected to decline from 81.64 million in 2009 to 45.95 million
in 2055. This is a matter of economics (of paying for pensions, welfare and medical care
from the taxes of a shrinking labour force) but also a matter of labour (of finding the
labour power to deal with the physical care of the aged).4 As Huguet points out, in order
to improve this ratio, Japan would need to raise its birth rate, raise its retirement age, and
allow substantial increases in the immigration of people of working age (Huguet 2003:
107–124). The government’s efforts to raise the birth rate have been ineffective, (Roberts
2002) and the crisis in elder care has been dealt with by encouraging the immigration of
workers on a temporary basis, as will be discussed below.

Imagine a married woman in her fifties, whose husband is the primary
breadwinner.5 It is likely that her parents and her husband’s parents will be alive and in

their late seventies. One or more of her grandparents might be still be alive and in their
nineties. She might be engaged in part-time work, but will have to juggle work with
caring for the needs of aging parents and in-laws who may or may not live close by.
Many such women give up paid work in order to manage the care of aging relatives. The
government has attempted to deal with these issues with a system of carers’ insurance
(Kaigo Hoken Hô/Law Concerning Insurance for Nursing Care, 1997, amended 2000),
but carers are likely to be employed on a casual or part-time basis. This means that
someone has to manage the activities and timetabling of relatives, paid carers and
volunteers, and this burden falls disproportionately on women.

Until the 1990s, it seemed unimaginable that Japan might consider the use of the
services of immigrant workers in order to deal with the crisis in elder care. In the first
decade of the twenty-first century, however, this has become a reality. As there are not
enough Japanese workers willing or able to engage in caring labour, it has become
necessary to bring in immigrant workers who are qualified as nurses or carers.
Nevertheless, the scale and forms of such immigration are being closely controlled and
monitored. At the same time, there has been a decline in the kind of manufacturing and
labouring jobs which have been filled by short-term labour immigrants in recent years.

Managing the Labour Market

In the latter decades of the twentieth century, the Japanese economy gradually
shifted from one based on agriculture and manufacturing to a largely post-industrial
economy based on services, technology, knowledge, information and finance. In 2008
primary industry accounted for 4.2 percent of employment, secondary industry 26.4
percent and tertiary industry 68.2 percent. There has been a steady decline in the
percentage of workers engaged in primary industry throughout the post-World War II

period; the number engaged in manufacturing has shown a decline in every year since
1993 (except for a brief upturn in 2006); and there has been a corresponding increase in
the percentage of workers engaged in tertiary industry from 1980 to the present (Statistics
Bureau, Japan, 2009: 132).

From the 1970s to the 1990s, a large part of manufacturing production was moved
offshore, in search of looser environmental controls, weaker labour unions, and cheaper
labour power. Some sectors of manufacturing, involving sub-contracting and sub-subcontracting to the large industrial conglomerates, did, however, stay onshore, and this
work was variously undertaken by married women in part-time or casual positions, rural
labour on a seasonal basis, and from the 1980s by immigrant labour. Some immigrants
worked legally as kenshûsei (trainees) on limited term contracts and short-term visas,
while others entered on tourist visas and overstayed. The construction industry also
became reliant on (largely undocumented) immigrant labour in these years (Yamanaka
2000: 63). The savings to employers are not necessarily in wages. Rather, irregular
workers ‘cost their employers significantly less because they do not receive the numerous
expensive benefits, entitlements and job security that Japanese regular employees do’
(Yamanaka 2000: 87–88).

For the last decade, however, the automotive industry has been in crisis. This crisis
has been reflected in a number of mergers between Japanese and European automobiIe
manufacturers. This has also resulted in the hiring of managers from overseas, such as the
high profile Carlos Ghosn, CEO of Nissan since 1999 on its merger with Renault. This
crisis deepened in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The collapse
of the automobile industry is significant for it was formerly one of the mainstays of the
economy and a major export industry, and wages for skilled workers in this sector to a
large extent determined wages in other sectors. Subcontractors to this industry have, more

recently, been major employers of labour immigrants, and thus it is these immigrants who
have been disproportionately affected by the most recent economic downturn (‘Axed
Brazilians, Peruvians to be paid to leave Japan’, 2009). Trainees (kenshûsei) have also
been affected. Data from the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization
show that the number of companies’ applications for permitting foreigners into Japan as
trainees or technical interns in October 2008 fell 18.8 percent from a year earlier to
4,753; the figure for November 2008 stood at 4,692, down 25.5 percent from a year
before. The number of people entering Japan to become trainees had been increasing
since the foreign trainee system started in 1993, topping 100,000 in 2007 (‘Foreign
trainees at Japan firms growing rare’. 2009).6 Nevertheless, this also takes place at a time
when there are shortages of skilled labour, due to the changing demographics of the
population and the changing labour market.

Japan has been hard hit by the most recent global economic crisis. The Japanese
economy was unable to sustain growth in 2008, due to a decline in export growth, and the
economy recorded its first contraction since 2002. Corporate profits plunged and business
investment fell. Unemployment rose until mid-2009, and most new positions created
have been part-time rather than full-time permanent positions, meaning that there has
been little growth in wages, and a resulting lack of consumer confidence (Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2009: 143–5). The depth of the recession was
July 2009, with some modest improvement from August 2009 (‘Unemployment rate falls
to 5.5%’. 2009).

In the current economic situation, there are regular calls for reform of the regulation
of labour immigration (‘Plan to woo skilled workers urged’. 2009; ‘Point system eyed to
attract foreign experts’. 2009). There is an implicit privileging of mental labour over
physical labour encoded in immigration policy – a mind/body split whereby intellectual,

white collar work is given recognition, but not manual and physical labour, and certainly
not sexual labour (Mackie 2002: 200–229). Some élite white-collar workers enter Japan
temporarily on working visas, and this is recognised under the rubric of
‘internationalisation’ (kokusaika). These élite white-collar workers have much in
common with the élite middle-class white-collar Japanese worker, except for their
nationality and lineage. The entry of such workers was facilitated by amendments to the
Immigration Control Law (Shutsunyûkoku oyobi Nanmin Nintei Kanri-hô) in 1990, at the
same time as it became possible for those of Japanese descent to enter Japan to work,
albeit generally in less privileged occupations.

The Japanese Department of Immigration does not explicitly permit immigration
for the purpose of engaging in unskilled labour. There are, however, several major
loopholes. Students may engage in limited part-time work, and some workers enter the
country under the category of ‘trainees’ (kenshûsei). As noted above, a special category
for those of Japanese ancestry has brought immigrants from Japanese-descended
communities in Latin America to Japan as workers. Despite their Japanese ancestry, these
workers often came to Japan with limited Japanese-language skills and cultural
competence, and thus were relegated to relatively unskilled occupations.

It is seen as ‘natural’ that Japanese young people are increasingly reluctant to
engage in manual work, and that these places may be taken by immigrant workers, even
if illegally. The phrase ‘difficult, dirty and dangerous’ (kitsui, kitanai, kiken) used to
describe these marginalised occupations aligns them with the abject (Mackie 1998: 45–
64). The relegation of these marginalised occupations to the least privileged members of
society, including immigrant labour, allows members of the Japanese ‘mainstream’ to
imagine themselves as fully middle-class, as engaged in white-collar ‘mental’ work rather
than physical or unskilled work. The mind/body split is built into the very structures of

modern capitalist societies like Japan, and is intimately entwined with class structure. The
most prestigious occupations are those which have more of a mental component and less
of a physical component. The use of immigrant labour in particular occupations means
that these occupations come to be associated with particular ethnic groups, or, in other
words: are ethnicised. This is the context for the immigration of workers of Japanese
descent from the 1990s (Yamanaka 2000: 81).

While much of the discussion of immigrant labour in other parts of Asia has
focused on domestic work (Piper 2004: 216–231; Moya, 2007: 559–579; Misra and
Merz, 2005: 9), Japan is relatively distinctive in not importing large numbers of domestic
workers. The explanation for these distinctive patterns of immigration lies in the
connection between the gendered division of labour, the labour market and demography.
In Singapore, for example, middle-class educated women have been encouraged to stay
in the full-time workforce in élite occupations, thus necessitating the employment of
domestic labour (Cheah 2006: 178–266).7 In Japan, by contrast, the ‘double-burden’ of
childrearing and paid work has often been handled by women leaving the full-time
workforce in the years when their childrearing demands are heaviest, to return to the parttime workforce when children are older (Osawa 2005: 111–129). The relatively flat
income distribution in Japan also means that it is rarely feasible to employ domestic help.
With the aging of the population and the plummeting birthrate, the pressing need is for
the care of the aged and infirm.

Because of the official prohibition on importing ‘unskilled’ labour, it is illegal to
import labour for the purpose of domestic work, although anecdotal evidence suggests
that some families are finding ways to employ overseas domestic workers. In one
loophole, diplomatic personnel may employ domestic workers or chauffeurs who speak
English, and this allows them to employ overseas workers. While such workers have a

legitimate visa status, their home-based work does not come under the purview of the
Labour Standards Law (Rôdô Kijun Hô, 1947), the legislation which regulates the
working conditions of regular workers in workplaces such as offices and factories.8

Many commentators, however, see international marriage as a form of labour
migration. The women who immigrate as wives of Japanese men often provide domestic
labour, childcare and care of the sick and aged in their marital families, not to mention
engaging in paid labour in their communities (Itô 1992; Mackie 1998: 45–63; PiqueroBallescas 2009: 77–99). As Piquero-Ballescas points out, women who had originally
entered as ‘tourists, entertainers, spouses/children of Japanese nationals, trainees or
students’ were, in effect, ‘recruited as caregivers and providers of emotional labor in
Japan’ (2009: 78). In a highly gendered labour market, women of the Nikkei community,
too, have apparently often been employed as tsukisoi-nin (workers who provide informal
personal care for the sick or elderly, rather than medical or nursing care) and some have
actually come to Japan for that purpose (Tsuda 2003: 294; 297). Once again, there are
gendered expectations in the discourse on marriage and caring.

Piquero-Ballescas’ comments on the relationship between immigration, the labour
market and various forms of caring labour also remind us that, while immigration
categories are rigid, individuals find ways of moving between these categories. Someone
might initially enter on a tourist visa, but overstay to engage in various forms of
undocumented paid labour. Or, someone may have originally entered as an entertainer
(under an earlier visa regime), but enter into a relationship which transforms her into the
‘spouse of a Japanese national’, and thus be eligible to apply for permanent residency.
Regardless of state attempts to regulate the entry of various categories of residents, once
within the boundaries of the Japanese nation-state, individuals inevitably form
relationships with Japanese nationals or with other immigrants. The offspring of these

relationships have been the subject of many of the recent controversies concerning
nationality and residence category. It has recently been reported that ‘[o]ne in every 30
babies born in Japan has at least one foreign parent’ and ‘about 6.5 per cent of all
marriages in Japan in 2006 were international’ (McNeill et al 2009: unpaginated).The
management of border control is thus intimately connected with the management of the
labour market and the management of ‘biopower’ more broadly.

Managing Borders

The boundaries of the nation-state are policed through laws on immigration,
residency, citizenship and naturalisation. The law defines visa categories which
determine the conditions whereby an individual can live, work and form relationships
within the boundaries of the nation-state. These visa categories may also determine
access to benefits such as public housing, unemployment insurance, medical insurance,
welfare benefits or medical treatment.9 Those who remain outside the boundaries of the
nation-state include stateless persons and refugees (asylum seekers). Some individuals
are in an intermediate category with limited rights to live and work within the boundaries
of the nation-state, such as permanent residents, non-Japanese spouses of Japanese
nationals, trainees, international students, skilled international workers, and residents of
Japanese heritage. Others may be within the physical boundaries of the nation-state, but
without a recognised status: undocumented workers who engage in work which is not
compatible with their visa category, or ‘overstayers’ who remain in the country after their
visa has expired.10

The Constitution of Japan states, in Article 10, that ‘the conditions necessary for
being a Japanese national shall be determined by law’. The laws which regulate the
various categories of people resident in Japan include the Nationality Law (Kokuseki-hô,

Law No 147, enacted 25 May 1950, effective 1 July 1950), and the Immigration Control
and Refugee Recognition Law (Shutsunyûkoku oyobi Nanmin Nintei Kanri-hô, Cabinet
Order No 319, enacted 4 October 1951, effective 1 November 1951; amended 1985,
1990, 2004, 2006, 2009). Naturalisation is regulated by Articles 4 to 13 of the Nationality
Law. These interact with the Family Register Law (Koseki-hô, Law No 224, enacted 22
December 1947, effective 1 January 1948),11 Alien Registration Law (Gaikokujin
Tôroku-hô, Law No 125, enacted and effective 28 April 1951), the Resident Registration
Law (Jûmin Tôroku Hô, 1951, amended as the Basic Residency Records Law, Jûmin
Kihon Taichô Hô, in 1967), and articles of the Civil Code concerning marriage and
divorce.

Once someone has entered the country, legally or illegally, their rights can be
determined with reference to the various International Covenants. Japan has ratified the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1978), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1978), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1980), the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (1981), the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1995), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1994), but has not signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Hatsuse 2005: 165–166) or the
1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. As in many other countries,
the ability of migrant workers to claim rights under these conventions will often depend
on the advocacy of non-government organisations (Piper 2004: 22).

It should be noted that the boundaries of nationality and the geographical borders of
the nation-state are not identical. Because nationality is determined on the jus sanguinis
(bloodline) principle rather than the jus soli (place of birth) principle, it is possible to be

born and raised within the physical boundaries of the nation-state without having
Japanese nationality. Until 1985, the Nationality Law was based on patriarchal principles.
It was assumed in Japan, as in many other countries, that fathers had the right to
determine the nationality and domicile of family members. Only men had the right to
pass on Japanese nationality to their children, and the provisions for naturalisation of
foreign spouses were different for men and women. This became an issue after several
cases of stateless children (with Japanese mothers and non-Japanese fathers) appeared.
These provisions were modified in the mid-1980s, as the Nationality Law was overhauled
in preparation for Japan’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Although the most blatantly sexist
provisions of the Nationality Law were modified in 1985, the implementation of this law
still has gendered implications. Both men and women have the capacity to pass on
nationality to their children, but the child of a Japanese father and non-Japanese mother
may only have the ‘right’ to Japanese nationality if the father provides official
recognition (ninchi) of the child.

The necessity for the father to explicitly provide recognition (ninchi) of his
parentage has meant that it has been difficult for some non–Japanese mothers to claim
Japanese nationality for the children of Japanese fathers. Furthermore, a child born out of
wedlock between a Japanese father and a foreign mother could, until recently, get
Japanese nationality only if the father admitted paternity during the mother's pregnancy,
or if the couple married before the child turned 20. The Nationality Law has recently
been revised so that a father can recognise paternity even after the birth of the child. This
is the consequence of a Supreme Court ruling of 4 June 2008 that the provision of the law
on children born outside marriage was unconstitutional (‘Ruling Slams Unequal Bias in
Paternity Recognition’ 2006; Kamiya and Matsutani 2008; ‘No Paternity Pranks Yet,
Cops Say’ 2009; ‘Three held in baby nationality scam’. 2009).

The issue of paternity has taken on a further transnational dimension in campaigns
for the recognition of the nationality of children of Japanese fathers and non-Japanese
mothers born in other countries. Some are children born of Japanese fathers during World
War II; others are offspring of temporary liaisons between Japanese tourists or sojourners
and local women. A small number of the offspring of Japanese soldiers in the Philippines
have been successful in claiming Japanese nationality (Agnote 2008; Agnote 2009).

There have been several recent high-profile cases concerning overstayers. Maryam
Amine, a twenty-year old Iranian student, was allowed to stay on as a foreign student
after her parents and younger sister were deported in 2007. Her parents had entered Japan
on short-term visas in 1990 and 1991 and had overstayed. She was recently granted a
special residence permit by the Ministry of Justice and is expected to work as a nursery
school teacher once she graduates (‘10-year overstayer is granted new visa’, 2009). In
another protracted case, a thirteen-year old girl (born in Japan of Filipino parents who
had entered on false passports and overstayed) was recently granted a special one-year
residence permit in order to complete her education, but her parents were ordered to
return home to the Philippines. The young woman, Noriko Calderon, will need to apply
for a residence permit on a yearly basis, and may be able to apply for naturalisation on
turning twenty. These high-profile cases have been advanced through the support of nongovernmental organisations and support groups. These young women provide a rather
appealing image of the overstayer, and possibly distract attention from the large numbers
of overstayers who are deported each year.12 According to the Immigration Bureau, there
were 113,072 illegal foreign residents in Japan as of January 2009, after 39,382 were
deported in 2008. Some 7,388 foreigners received special permission to stay in 2007
(‘Filipino girl’s parents told to leave’. 2009; Fukue 2009a; Fukue 2009b; Fukue 2009c;
Fukue and Matsutani 2009; Watanabe 2009).

Currently, the systems of registering and tracking Japanese nationals and the
systems of registering and tracking non-Japanese residents are separate. Japanese
nationals have a family register entry, a resident registration and a nationality. NonJapanese residents have an alien registration card (Chapman 2008: 423–443). Under a
Bill for the amendment of the Nationality Law and the Immigration Control Law
(promulgated 15 July 2009), the two systems will be brought into line, and non-Japanese
residents will have a residence (zairyû) card which will allow for closer tracking of their
movements through the resident registration system. The new registration system will be
administered by the Justice Ministry at national level rather than by local governments as
occurs in the present system. While this appears neutral on the surface, in that the
treatment of Japanese and non-Japanese residents will be more similar, advocates for
immigrants fear that the result will be increased surveillance of non-Japanese residents
(Hongo 2008; ‘Bill on Immigration Overhaul OK’d’ (2009); ‘Foreigners stage a sit-in
outside Diet to protest immigration bills’. 2009; Matsutani 2009a; Matsutani 2009b;
Matsutani 2009c; Matsutani 2009d; Matsutani 2009e; Nagata 2009a; Nagata 2009b; Ito
2009; for the Bill to amend the existing laws, see Ministry of Justice. 2009). In order to
highlight the workings of the twin themes of the management of borders and the
management of bodies, I would now like to focus briefly on two groups: immigrant
workers of Japanese heritage, and immigrant care workers.

Labour immigrants of Japanese descent

In 1990, the Immigration Control Act was modified to allow descendants of
Japanese emigrants to enter Japan for up to three years, in a long-term resident category
with no restriction on engaging in employment (Shutsunyûkoku Oyobi Nanmin Nintei
Kanri-hô [Nationality and Refugee Recognition Law], as amended 1990). Those who
enter under this visa category may also bring their family members into Japan, and these

may be people who have even less connection with Japanese society. The yearly
admission of Brazilians quadrupled from 19,000 in 1988 to 79,000 in 1990. By 1996
more than 200,000 Nikkeijin workers and their families had registered as residents in
major manufacturing cities. (Yamanaka 2000: 71; Oka 1994: 41–49; Hatsuse 2005, p.
160). By 2007, there were 317,000 Japanese Brazilians in Japan (Daimon 2009).

In the 1990s, the temporary immigration of people of Japanese descent was seen as
a more acceptable way of dealing with labour shortages than inviting ‘guest workers’
with no apparent ties to the Japanese nation-state. Although the Japanese heritage of such
immigrants was probably expected to cut down on problems generated by perceptions of
difference, local communities soon found they had to deal with contact between groups
with different social and cultural expectations, while schools needed to address the
necessity of multilingual and multicultural education for the children of these families.
The co-existence of the descendants of Japanese emigrants reinforces the primacy of
Japanese lineage, but also has the potential to undermine the naturalised assumption that
blood-line equates with cultural competence. This assumption is a feature of many
national cultures, as pointed out by Barry Hindess, ‘[n]otions of descent (and the
apparently more respectable surrogate notion of a distinctive national culture that cannot
readily be acquired by persons who are not born into it) have always played an important
part in the way citizenship has been understood within particular communities’ (Hindess
1992: 22).

A labour ministry survey of companies in October 2008 found that there
were some 486,400 foreign workers in Japan. Of these, 43.3 percent were
Chinese, 20.4 percent Brazilians and 8.3 percent Filipinos. Many of these workers
underpinned the production of cars and other exported products when the
economy was good. In addition, many small firms and agricultural enterprises

employed foreign trainees (‘Editorial: Support Needy Foreign Workers’. 2009).
However, the national unemployment peaked at 5.7 per cent during 2009, and the
automobile industry was particularly hard hit. This industry is concentrated in
central Japan in Aichi prefecture, where an estimated 220,000 registered
foreigners reside (Yamanaka 2000: 80).

In April 2009 the government offered ¥300,000 to any unemployed immigrant
worker of Japanese ancestry who wished to leave the country, and ¥200,000 each to
family members, on the condition that they would not return to Japan. The government
also allocated ¥1.08 billion for training, including Japanese-language lessons, for the
workers of Japanese ancestry (‘Axed Brazilians, Peruvians to be paid to leave Japan’,
2009). Some local governments also started support programs for such workers. For
example, in Aichi Prefecture, the prefectural government and business community
established a fund to help immigrant workers learn Japanese. Several local governments
also petitioned the national government for emergency support (26 cities request
emergency support for foreign workers’. 2008) Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka Prefecture
reported plans to train unemployed foreigners to work in nursing care, an attempt to
implement change in what is a highly gendered and ethnicised labour market (‘Editorial:
Support Needy Foreign Workers’. 2009). As Yamanaka points out, ‘immigration policy
has created a labour force rigidly stratified by such collective characteristics as legal
status, ethnicity, nationality, gender and skill level’ (Yamanaka 2000: 63). Nearly two
decades later we are seeing the failures in planning for the long-term needs of the Nikkei
communities. If we compare the history of the use of immigrant labour of Japanese
descent with current attempts to use short-term immigrant labour in the caring
professions, the segmentation of the labour market according to ethnicity, nationality,
gender and skill level is thrown into sharp relief.

Transnational Care Work

Recent policies which provide insurance for the costs associated with the care of
the aged attempt to come to terms with the social requirements of a population where the
aged comprise an ever-increasing proportion of the population (Kaigo Hoken Hô/Law
Concerning Insurance for Nursing Care, 1997, amended 2000). As a supplement to the
care provided by family members, volunteers, paid carers and nursing professionals, the
Japanese government is moving slowly on bringing in care workers from overseas. This
is being managed by bilateral agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines.13 One
reason for the cautious progress of these programs is the necessity to negotiate with
advocates for the nursing and caring professions within Japan: the Japanese Nursing
Association and the Japan Association of Certified Care Workers.

The agreement with Indonesia was concluded in 2007, and the first care workers
entered the country during 2009 and commenced training and language study. However,
almost as soon as the first workers entered the country, concerns were being raised about
the effects of the economic recession. In addition, fewer jobs were being offered than
expected because of a perceived burden on facilities for supporting the Indonesian
workers, including Japanese language education, and the commencement of a similar
program with the Philippines in the same year. Japan was to accept up to 792 Indonesians
in fiscal 2009, but the number of jobs offered by Japanese hospitals and care facilities
totalled only 169 as of April 2009. The plan is to accept up to 400 nurses and up to 600
caregivers over two years starting from fiscal 2008. A total of 208 Indonesian workers
came in the first year of the program. Around 1,000 nurses and caregivers in Indonesia
registered as applicants to work in Japan (‘Job shortage hits Indonesia nurses’ 2009).

For those who started work in Japan during 2009, there were reports of language

problems and issues in adjusting to a different workplace environment. All of the care
workers admitted so far will work in hospitals and nursing facilities and not in private
care. They will be expected to pass exams in three or four years in order to gain
qualifications if they wish to stay on in Japan. They could in some ways, then, be seen as
a specific form of ‘trainee’. They have been provided with a six-month language course
which allows them to communicate in basic spoken Japanese, but much more specialised
language training will be necessary in order to tackle the national caregiver qualifying
examinations. The second group of Indonesian workers, up to about 800 nurses and
caregivers, were planned to arrive at the end of 2009 (Kaneko 2009).

The agreement with the Philippines (JPEPA) was signed in September 2006, but it
took the Philippines Senate nearly two years to ratify it. Besides providing a framework
for liberalising trade and investment between the two countries and allowing Filipino
nurses (kangoshi) and caregivers (kangofukushi) to work in Japan, the agreement also
detailed possible cooperative programs, including training courses for the regulation of
and supervision of financial institutions, trade and investment cooperation, cooperation in
the field of small and medium enterprises, technical cooperation in the field of science
and communications technology and promotion of tourism. Under the agreement,
Filipino nurses and caregivers were scheduled to arrive in Japan in 2009 and 2010 to
undergo language training for half a year before going to work at hospitals and nursingcare facilities across Japan. The nurses and caregivers are endorsed by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration. The Japan International Corporation of Welfare
Services (JICWELS) is responsible for finding hospitals and health-care institutions in
Japan willing to hire the qualified Filipino nurses. It is planned to accept 1,000 Filipino
workers over a two-year period (Piquero-Ballescas 2009: 78; Agnote 2008; ‘Filipino
caregivers coming this year’. 2009).

In the Philippines, more than 400 nursing schools are producing more nursing
graduates than can be employed by hospitals and rest homes. Many of the fresh graduates
are pinning their hopes on finding a job overseas. For those from the Philippines, who
have been educated in English, however, other countries, such as U.S., Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and Britain may seem more accessible than Japan. Concern has also been
expressed internationally about the exodus of medical professionals from developing
countries to first world countries. This has prompted the World Health Organisation to
develop the Global Code on International Recruitment of Health Personnel (Cheng 2009,
pp. 111–112). As wealthy first world countries seek personnel from around the world to
care for the bodily needs of their citizens, third world countries increasingly suffer from a
lack of medical professionals, nurses and care workers to look after the needs of their
own populations.

Conclusions

The issues currently being faced in contemporary Japan are a harbinger of issues
soon to be faced by other advanced economies which are characterised by rising life
expectancy and plummeting birth rates. To trace the circuits of labour mobility in the
Asia-Pacific region is also to map the patterns of economic inequality in the region. The
mobilisation of people as workers, citizens and members of reproductive families has
hitherto mainly been considered within the frame of the nation-state, with reference to
Foucault’s concept of ‘biopower’ (1980: 138-145). Globalisation, however, prompts us to
consider questions of biopower on a regional and global scale, transcending the scale of
the nation-state. The management of labour power, the management of populations and
the management of care for the bodies of individuals also need to be considered in a
transnational frame (Mackie and Stevens 2009: 269). Global corporations attempt to
maximise profits through accessing cheaper labour power, while workers attempt to

maximise their income through crossing national borders. Meanwhile, governments try to
find ways of providing care for aging populations. Some who cross borders undertake
occupations characterised as ‘dirty, difficult and dangerous’, while others cross borders to
take care of the bodies of others in nursing, caregiving or domestic labour. Nation-states
attempt to regulate these flows through border controls. National governments like Japan,
however, struggle to manage a labour market which is stratified and segmented according
to gender, class, caste, ethnicity and nationality. Indeed, this segmentation is in part
attributable to the ad hoc decisions on recruiting labour power through specific bilateral
agreements. The body comes into play in distinguishing between prestigious, skilled
occupations and less prestigious ones which are seen as unskilled and often seen as
involving physical or manual labour. The body also comes into play in the need to
provide care for those who are aging or infirm. The case studies in this article
demonstrate that the management of border control and the management of the labour
market are ultimately concerned with the management of bodies.
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